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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE Of UTAH
MARY A. MURPHY, dba ALEX PICKERING TRANSFER COMPANY,
Plaintiff
-vs-

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH, REDMAN MOVING & STORAGE
COMPANY, BARTON TRUCK LINE,
INC., UINTAH FREIGHlWAYS, MAGNAGARFIELD TRUCK LINE, PALMER
BROTHERS, INC., RIO GRANDE MOTOR WAY, INC., MILNE TRUCK LINES,
INC., ASHWORTI-I TRANSFER, INC.,
BILLS MOVING, INC., A-ONE MOVING
AND DELIVERY, LEWIS BROS. STAGE
LINES, UTAH PACKAGE EXPRESS, INC.,
DENVER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN
RAILROAD COMPANY, and PARK CITY
TRUCK LINE,
Defendants.

Case No.

22920

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF

j

)

l

lj

Plaintiff submits this Brief in reply to defendants'
Brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

ARGUMENT ON FACTS

Defendants' statement of facts, page 3, says a petition was filed with the Commission on June 15, 1936,

praying for rehearing of the Commission's order of May
16, 1936, which granted plaintiff's predecessor in interest
a contract carrier permit. Defendants' Brief says the petition for rehearing was never acted upon by the Commission. This is immaterial because:
( 1) The petition for rehearing was not timely
filed and hence the Commission was without
jurisdiction to reconsider. Petitions for rehearing must be filed within 20, not 30 days.
See 76-16-15, U.C.A. 1933, now 54-7-15
U.C.A. 1953.
(2) Defendants are barred by laches and are
estopped from now claiming the Commission
should reconsider its 1936 order.
(3) In the July 10, 1972, order, paragraph 6
thereof, the Commission found without
merit defendants' claim that the Commission
should reconsider its May, 1936, order, and
no appeal herein has been taken therefrom by
defendants.
Defendants' statement of facts, page 4, comments
that the Commission's 1954 order, to which no one objected, in dictum, noted that had the 1954 application
been one other than to transfer, the Commission would
have been compelled by McCarthy vs. Public Service
Commission, 94 Utah 304, 77 P.2d 331, to deny the
transfer because no hearing was afforded interested parties when the permit was first issued in 1936. That
comment is immaterial because:

( 1) The Commission did approve the transfer to
plaintiff in 1954 without objection from anyone, making the permit then and now perfectly valid. Indeed, the Commission in its
1972 order did not find to the contrary and
defendants did not appeal therefrom.
(2) The Commission's 1954 dicta was wrong anyway. The McCarthy case did not require a
hearing before granting a "granddaddy" permit, as the Commission in the 1954 order
said. Instead, McCarthy held that "granddaddy" permits issued without hearing are
prima facia valid but that upon timely filing
of petition for rehearing the Commission must
order hearing. In McCarthy, the Court reversed and remanded because the very same
defendants as here there filed timely petition
for rehearing but here defendants did not file
timely petition for rehearing to the 1936
order and are estopped to complain now.
Defendants' statement of facts, page 5, quotes Commission Rule No. V (b) which says:
"All interruptions of regular service of common
motor carriers and contract motor carriers where
such interruptions are likely to continue for more
than one scheduled trip shall be promptly reported
in writing to the Commission ... "
This is immaterial because plaintiff's contract carrier authority is neither regular nor scheduled; it is irregular,
radial, on-call authority.
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POINT II. THE COMMISSION'S REQUIREMENT
THAT PICKERING TAKE STATUTORY STEPS BEFORE ADDING ADDITIONAL CONTRACT SHIPPERS IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.
The Commission's 1972 order holds plaintiff must
obtain a new contract carrier permit in the usual formal
statutory process for each new shipper she might serve.
Defendant's Brief, pages 12-13, attempts to justify this
saying the Commission in 1954 pursuant to 54-6-24,
U.C.A. 1953, reduced plaintiff's predecessor's permit to a
50 mile radial authority and to service to those shippers
for whom she might file contracts within 20 days. The
statutory language for such reduction, defendants claim,
comes from emphasizing out of context the words " ... and
being operated by that person alone or in conjunction
with others at the time of his death ... "
The words "and being operated" do not appear to be
words of limitation to the foregoing words "all rights,
permits ... ". They cannot mean that only the rights
to serve the territory and persons which the deceased was
serving at his death may be transferred and no others,
for if such were the meaning, the most snarly problems
concerning where, how far, for whom, how long ago, and
how many times did the deceased serve before his death
would arise when no such problems would ever arise for
corporate permit holders who cannot die. Instead, "and
being operated" refers to the following words "by that
person alone or in conjunction with others at the time
of his death ... "
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At best, this statute might authorize the Commission not to transfer a wholly abandoned certificate or
permit as one not "being operated" but it can hardly be
read to authorize examination into the number of persons last served by a general commodities common or
contract carrier, inter vivos and consequent restriction
to precisely those persons thereafter. Whether a general
unscheduled, on-call permit holder served one, ten or ten
thousand persons the day or year before his death, he
would still be "operating" his permit at time of death.
There certainly is no finding in the Commission's
1954 order that indicates or ever discusses the shippers
Murphy was or was not serving, so the Commission cannot have intended in 1954 to find Murphy abandoned the
right to serve any particular shippers and hence, his permit was clearly being operated in its entirety with respect,
to the unlimited number of shippers.
Contrast this to the Commission's express finding in
the 1954 order, paragraph 3, that Murphy was operating
at his death only the part of his authority within a fifty
mile radius of Salt Lake City.
Hence, not only does defendants' reasoning for justifying the Commission's order fail, but we note defendants have wholly ignored explaining just how the Commission obtained authority in the 1954 transfer application to restrict the general permit to any particular
shippers when no proposed restriction was noticed for
hearing. Defendants wholly failed to distinguish Morris
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vs. Public Service Commission, 7 Utah 2d 72, 368 P.2d
590, cited and relied upon in plaintiff's initial Brief.
That case holds that in transfer applications, unless certificate or permit cancellation, and hence reduction, is
noticed for hearing, the Commission is without authority
to cancel and hence, to restrict, the certificate or permit.

Defendants' citation of Goodrich vs. Public Service
Commission, 114 Utah 296, 198 P.2d 975 is inappropriate for that case concerned only the application of a contract carrier expressly limited to particular shippers. It
did not concern a general contract carrier, as here.

POINT III.
SERVICE.

PLAINTIFF DID NOT DISCONTINUE

Defendants' Point II and the argument therein
wholly begs the issue. Their brief, page 17, merely assumes the evidence shows that plaintiff "ceased" or "discontinued" service for Industrial Supply and states these
verbs as proven facts. They are not so proven, nor is
there a scintilla of evidence in the record to sustain these
conclusions, as pointed out in plaintiff's initial brief, page
21-5, and defendants' brief does not cite us to any facts
in the record to support these conclusions. All the record shows is that no service was called for by Industrial
Supply after 1962; that is not "ceasing" or "discontinu. '' service.
.
mg
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CONCLUSION
Defendants' Brief fails to cite where in the record
there is any evidence to support the Commission's finding.
The Commission's orders are, therefore, arbitrary and
unreasonable.
Wherefore, plaintiff renews her prayer that the Court
reverse the Commission's orders of May 12 and July 10,
1972, and that plaintiff be awarded her costs.

Respectfully submitted,
MOYLE & DRAPER
Joseph J. Palmer,

Attorneys for Plaintiff
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